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Abstract 
 
In 2008 occurred the beginning of what was to become the most comprehensive, global, 
financial crisis in modern time. The recent crisis has been substantial for most developed 
countries, where almost all Eurozone members have showed negative economic results. Our 
goal is to determine, with as much accuracy as possible, if austerity contributes to the 
Eurozone-countries’ recovery process from the Euro crisis. We are measuring austerity by 
examining the changes in the CAPB (Cyclically-adjusted primary balance)-variable, also 
known as the fiscal stance.  
An increase in fiscal stance would mean that the country is heading towards a further 
contractionary fiscal policy. We are studying fiscal stance in correlation to our dependent 
variables GDP, unemployment and bank solvency. Our results show that in general an 
implantation of contractionary fiscal policy decreases GDP but increases unemployment and 
bank solvency. We are comparing two groups of countries, the GIPSI countries and the Baltic 
States, where we can see significant differences how our dependent variables are affected by 
CAPB. 
Austerity is an effective method for tightening country’s economy deficits and debts during 
normal conditions. But the measure might become ineffective and counterproductive when 
the normal economic conditions past and financial turmoil emerges. The general conclusion 
would be that fiscal stance is not contributing to a country’s recovery process, but with 
exceptions such as the Baltic States.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal stance, Austerity, Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance, the Eurozone, 
Fiscal recovery 
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1. Introduction 
	  
In 2008 occurred the beginning of what was to become the most comprehensive, global, financial 
crisis in modern time. The recent crisis has been a substantial fiscal burden for most developed 
countries. Along with the financial crisis, members of the Eurozone have suffered deteriorate bank 
solvency and increasing debts, where Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain (also known as the 
GIPSI countries) suffered the biggest output declines. It started a downward spiral throughout Europe, 
where the Eurozone countries’ governmental debts increased, along with the liability and credibility 
within the financial sectors in the countries. Cleaning up the governmental debts and organizing the 
fiscal policy were of highest priority for every country. This strict fiscal action can be described as 
‘austerity’. 
Austerity measures are policies to reduce government budget deficits. This is achieved by bringing 
revenues closer to expenditure by either cut government spending or increase taxes. Implementation of 
austerity measures are an alternative for countries to express their fiscal discipline towards creditors 
and other parties involved, such as foreign banks and credit rating agencies. When government’s debt 
liabilities are questioned, austerity measures are often used to regain the trust for the country’s ability 
to pay (Alesina et. al, 2015). 
We will be examining the effects of austerity by studying the changes in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance, also called the fiscal stance. By examining how the effects of fiscal stance contribute 
to the Eurozone’s recovery process we will determine whether that austerity measure is the most 
appropriate measure to get the Eurozone back to its economic standards. Will the outcome result in 
positive or negative effects for the general member state? However, it is important to mention that one 
answer does not exclude another.  
By studying the effects of fiscal stance we hope to conclude whether to concur or not with the German 
Finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who stated in 2011 that “austerity is the only cure for the 
Eurozone” (Schäuble, 5th of September, Financial Times, 2011).  
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1.2 Purpose  
The literature about austerity as a tool to reduce budget deficits and economic recovery 
remains divided. One standard economic model, The Keynesian model, argues that cuts in 
government spending and/or raising of taxes, will have a contractionary effects on aggregate 
demand and therefore GDP-growth. This theory is the most common perception of austerity. 
But recent literature by Alesina and Ardagna (2009), among others, argues that some austerity 
measures can have positive effects on both GDP and aggregated demand in a country. 
These contradictions on the subject made us curious about how austerity measures have 
affected the Eurozone’s recovery from the financial crisis. In our thesis we will examine the 
austerity measures by studying the changes in CAPB (Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Balance), 
also known as fiscal stance. The purpose of this thesis is also to examine whether the 
countries in the Eurozone have applied these measures of austerity and to what extent. We 
will analyze how this has affected their recovery, by looking at the GDP-growth, 
unemployment rate and bank general solvency together with a few control variables.  
The Euro area that we are examining includes: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. We also included Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, since their currencies 
were pegged against the Euro and their actions during the crisis followed the policies that 
were implemented in the Euro area. These decisions were made because of their ambition to 
enter the Eurozone in the near future. 
In our thesis we will include the following questions: 
I. Have the austerity measures contributed to the financial recovery or not?   
II. Have they aggravated the situation?  
III. Have these measures been effective for some and, not for others? 
 
We will include a comparison between the GIPSI (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy) 
countries and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) based on our results, to clarify 
our assumptions further. These groups of countries have been affected the most of the 
financial crisis and of the austerity measures, which we found was interesting.	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1.3 Disposition 
Section 2 will briefly explain the background of what caused the Eurozone crisis in general, 
which will give the reader a better understanding of the situation and therefore our thoughts 
on the issues. We will identify how austerity can be detected and what kind of model we use 
for measuring austerity in our thesis. We also provide some general information and thoughts 
about how austerity measures have been implemented in the Euro area. Also, we will present 
an explanation of the term ‘austerity’. Moreover we will explain what the effects are (both 
positive and negative effects) of austerity and fiscal stance. Thereafter we will review the 
measurements in context to the financial situation that has been created in the Eurozone. We 
will identify how austerity can be detected and what kind of model we use for measuring 
austerity in our thesis.  
The last part in this section will describe the Non-Keynesian theory concerning fiscal policy. 
Further on, Section 3 will contain empirical data and previous studies. We will analyze them 
in a way where we can present them, both critically and also highlight their relevant studies. 
In section 4 we will present our econometric analysis along with data. We will begin to define 
our variables and explain them. Then we will explain our methods and theories that we have 
used. Further on, we will explain our equation specifications, where all different variables in 
our regressions and equations will be described. We will finally present our results and 
analyze them by give our reflections about them. In this section we will also present graphs 
and tables of relevant data that can strengthen our point of view when analyzing the results. 
Section 5 presents our main findings and conclusion of our thesis. This section will also 
include suggestions for further studies within the subject. The latter sections 6 and 7 will 
contain bibliography/references, data appendix and finally all our tables of regressions. 
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2. Background 
2.1 The fiscal policy in aftermath of the financial crisis 
	  
When the financial crisis hit in 2008 the European countries did not enter it with good 
economic conditions. Many of the countries had before the crisis high deficits and debt. The 
main reasons for this were the low interest rates that the Eurozone countries had had during 
the first decade of the Euro. This created a large build-up of debt across Europe, especially in 
the periphery countries such as Italy and Greece. But, worries about the financial stability in 
the Eurozone were not just restricted to the peripheral countries. An ageing population in the 
entire Eurozone with higher social expenditure as a consequence, combined with the financial 
crisis, worsened governments already structurally weak budgets. Many countries also had to 
save their financial sector by issuing extensive rescue packages. The deficit in the Eurozone 
reached 6.4 percent of GDP in 2009 and debt to GDP ratio from 66.2 percent in 2008 to 91 
percent, in 2010. Automatic stabilizers and fiscal actions were made by the governments to 
reduce the massive impact that the financial crisis had on unemployment and the protection of 
financial institutions (Alesina et. al. 2015). 
These large budget deficits started a widespread anxiety about the unsustainability of public 
debt in many Euro area countries and the demand for higher interest rates on government 
bonds increased. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that all the 
Eurozone countries have signed, combined with the demand for higher interest rates forced 
the EMU members to begin fiscal consolidation and austerity measures. Multi-year programs 
where implemented, with the goal to reduce deficits and debt (Busch et. al, 2013). 
2.2 The austerity measures 
 
Austerity measures are policies set in action to reduce government budget deficits and 
government debt. This is achieved by increasing revenues and reducing expenditures. There 
are two ways to do this, either in the form of spending cuts, tax increases or both. 
Implementation of austerity measures is a good method to express their fiscal discipline 
towards creditors and other parties involved, such as foreign banks and credit rating agencies. 
When a government’s liability of debt is questioned, it usually reflects in that interest rates on 
sovereign bonds rise because of an increased demand of higher risk premiums.  
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Austerity measures can be used to regain the trust for a country's ability to pay these interests 
and loans. As a country it is important to show the rest of the world that you are a nation with 
financial stability (Alesina et. al. 2015).’ 
The Maastricht Treaty was founded in 1997 and is the foundation to what we call the 
European Union. The treaty’s objective is to create a common market with integration of key 
areas, for example strengthen democratic legitimacy, establish an economic and monetary 
union and maintain a common foreign and security policy (europa.eu, 2010). 
Ever since the crisis has the austerity policy of the Maastricht Treaty been strengthened, 
because of the general political and economic view that debt is the main cause of the 
Eurozone crisis. The indebted periphery countries had great possibilities to reduce their public 
debt during the time of economic growth before 2007, instead when the crisis hit, they already 
had high public debt and deficits. Through expensive public debt bailouts of banks and 
extensive expansion policies the debt grew out of control for many countries to handle. 
Economists have since the beginning of the financial crisis argued that it is not the crisis itself 
that have caused this downward spiraling effect on the economy, but the non-existing 
austerity measures and lack of preparation during the time of economic growth (Busch et. al, 
2013). 
 
Austerity programs are often controversial and opponents often argue that austerity measures 
depress the economy and economic growth. It reduces government tax income which often 
outweighs the implemented spending cuts. When an economy is forced to implement austerity 
measurements this can also cause deflation, which will boost current debt and aggravate the 
crisis further. But still, austerity policy is considered to be the most favorable policy within 
the Eurozone, compared to the growth policy. This has according to many been the main 
reason for the continued stagnation of the European economy.  Countries such as Greece, 
Spain and Portugal implemented heavy austerity measures and the result of weak growth 
compared to the U.S, where more expensive measures have been implemented. However, 
without the debt reduction in 2011, the public debt ratio in Greece would have been much 
severe, around 200 percent of GDP (Busch et. al, 2013).  
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Another issue that the Eurozone has to deal with is that the share of export towards non-
European countries is much smaller than the intra-euro trade. The big non-European trading 
partners such as China and East Asia, whom rely on price competitiveness, makes it even less 
likely that austerity will help the GIPSI countries to improve their net export and growth, 
because of a their high Relative Unit Labor Cost.  
 
An additional factor is that if all the Eurozone countries simultaneously implement austerity 
measures, the intra-euro exports and import will fall and cause major problem for individual 
countries and the Eurozone (Zezza, 2012). Paul Krugman has explained that “since a 
government is not like a household, reductions in government spending during economic 
downturns will worsen crises. Across an economy, one person's spending is another person's 
income. If everyone is trying to reduce their spending, the economy can be trapped /.../, and 
worsening the recession as GDP falls. If the private sector is unable or unwilling to consume 
at a level that increases GDP and employment sufficiently /.../ the government should be 
spending more in order to offset the decline in private spending” (Krugman, 2012).  
2.3 Identify fiscal austerity 
 
Fiscal austerity can be estimated and measured in different ways. The analytic framework that 
we use to approximate the effects of fiscal austerity on economic activity is called cyclically-
adjusted primary balance (CAPB). This is the most popular method and the changes in it are 
used as the indicator of fiscal policy stance by international institutions, such as The European 
Commission and OECD (Borys et.al, 2011). 
“The cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is calculated by taking the actual primary 
balance––non-interest revenue minus non-interest spending––and subtracting the estimated 
effect of business cycle fluctuations on the fiscal accounts”(Guajardo et al., 2011).  
CAPB is a useful tool to analyze changes in fiscal stance, since it only reflects on intentional 
policy decisions that the governmental authority have put into action. Automatic effect on 
receipts and expenditures, which is caused by fluctuations in the business cycle, is not 
reflected in CAPB. An increase in the CAPB would therefore be evidence of intentional fiscal 
policy tightening (0 > CAPB: expansionary fiscal policy) and (0 < CAPB: contractionary 
fiscal policy). The use of CAPB in our thesis is of outmost importance since we are analyzing 
a period of great declines in GDP and economic activity (Ghosh and Misra, 2014). 
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Also, the variable is our tool to evaluate and compare fiscal policies that the governments in 
the Euro area are implementing. The change in CAPB, that we are interested in to examining, 
can also be called fiscal stance.  
2.4 Non-Keynesian Theory 
 
In contrast to the Keynesian theory, there also exists a Non-Keynesian theory concerning 
fiscal policy. The explanations of the non-Keynesian effects can be divided into two 
categories:  
 
The first category explains that non-Keynesian effects only occur when a government facing a 
financial crisis and reduces the budget deficit at instant. To do so, the government introduces 
a fiscal consolidation strong enough to stop the growth of public debt. According to this 
explanation, businesses and households become more confident about the future, and start to 
spend more. As a result, the increase in the private consumption compensates for the previous 
reduction in the “government-led demand” (Ciżkowicz and Rzonca, 2005).  
The second category, however, explains how the non-Keynesian effects depends on the 
structure of fiscal contraction rather than “the scale of the initial fiscal imbalance” (Ciżkowicz 
and Rzonca, 2005). 
 
The non-Keynesian effects are based on positive supply shocks, whose nature is determined 
by how much the current fiscal policy is tightened. Important to highlight is that it is not 
determined by how the fiscal policy was conducted in the past. The key point of the Non-
Keynesian effects is the reduction in enterprises’ costs brought on by reducing government 
expenditures. If a government is decreasing their deficit by cutting expenditures on wages and 
salaries, the business profitability increases. Because the wage expenditure is one of the main 
costs for an enterprise, this cost-cutting softens up the pressure of wages throughout the entire 
economy (Ciżkowicz and Rzonca, 2005). 
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3. Previous studies / Literature reviews 
 
In our thesis we are focusing on the austerity measures, regarding fiscal stance, in the 
Eurozone. We are examining if it is a proper tool to be able to recover from the Euro crisis. Of 
course, there are several articles, previous studies and books about the Euro crisis, its 
appearance and outcome. The same goes for the austerity measurements. In this section we 
will try to put out a few similarities as well as differences between our thesis and previous 
studies. Below, we have summarized a few authors worth mentioned, which have all played a 
part in our research and discussions. 
3.1 Giavazzi and Pagano 
 
We have been using two articles written by Francesco Giavazz and Marco Paganoi. The first 
article that we used is called “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be Expansionary? Tales of Two 
Small European Countries”, where they discuss the terms of fiscal contractions, also called 
expansionary austerity (Giavazzi and Pagano, 2000). 
The main hypothesis that they introduces predicts that a large reduction in government 
spending would change the future expectations about taxes and government spending that will 
result in an overall fiscal expansion by increasing the private consumption. They are 
examining the effects of fiscal contractions with both the Keynesian view and the expectation 
view; that “stresses the role of current changes in taxes or in government spending as signals 
of possible future changes” (Giavazzi and Pagano, 2000). 
There is however some differences between our methods. First of all, Giavazzi and Pagano 
only focus on comparing two European countries: Denmark and Ireland. In contrast to our 
thesis that is observing the entire Eurozone, which make our study a lot more comprehensive. 
Secondly, the authors are not discussing fiscal stance when measuring austerity. Instead, they 
are focusing to fiscal contractions, by only looking at the terms of private- and government 
consumptions (Giavazzi and Pagano, 2000). 
The other article written by Giavazzi and Pagano, that we thought was valuable to our study 
was their earlier work called “Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy Changes”. 
 In this paper, they verify that fiscal policy changes, both contractionary and expansionary, 
can have non-Keynesian effects if they are sufficiently large and determined.   
Also they investigate if “the sign of the response of private demand to fiscal policy actions 
depends on their size and persistence” (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1995).  
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Just as the previous article they are focusing in particular to the private consumption, however 
this study is more complete because they are examining all the OECD countries. They begin 
with measuring the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance explained as a percent of 
potential GDP. We especially found their econometric specifications to be useful to our study, 
because they also lag all their variables and uses fixed effects in both time period and 
countries (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1995). 
The most notable difference between our study and theirs is that they do not use CAPB as a 
measurement for austerity. Also, in the latter mentioned article they examine if the responses 
in fiscal policy changes depend on size rather than austerity. But, as mentioned earlier, these 
two articles were a great source of inspiration to our study. 
3.2 Alesina and Ardagna 
 
Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna have also inspired us. In their article ’Large changes in 
fiscal policy: Taxes versus spending’ from 2010 they discuss that fiscal austerity measures did 
not hurt economies, instead, it actually helped the country’s recovery from the Euro crisis. 
They examine episodes of large stances in the fiscal policy, both concerning fiscal stimuli and 
fiscal adjustments in the OECD countries. When mentioning fiscal stimuli the article state that 
tax cuts are more likely to increase economic growth than fiscal stimuli based upon spending 
increases. When it comes to fiscal adjustments it is the opposite, where adjustments based 
upon spending cuts are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over GDP instead of those 
based upon tax increases. “In addition to this, fiscal adjustments on the spending side are 
more likely to create recessions rather than on the tax side (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). 
Alesina and Ardagna are trying to identify key changes in fiscal policy either expansionary 
(where deficit increases or by surplus reduction) or contractionary that are the opposite. On 
fiscal adjustments (deficit reductions) we consider their effect on a medium term 
stabilization/reduction of the debt over GDP level and their cost in terms of a downturn in the 
economy. We focus only on large fiscal changes because we try to isolate fiscal policy 
changes that are induced as opposed to cyclical fluctuations of the deficits, which in any event 
we try to cyclically adjust.  Moreover, their study is based on a significantly larger research, 
based on larger samples of countries and years (1970-2007). They mainly tries to explain that 
fiscal consolidations are sometimes correlated with rapid output growth, particularly if 
implemented by cutting government spending rather than by increasing taxes.  
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Once again, we are examining CAPB, where government expenditures minus tax revenues, is 
being revised. To clarify, they are studying the OECD-countries. But, just as Guajardo et al. 
are mentioning in their article, they are using variables that are remarked of the cyclically 
adjusted balance. 
3.3 Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori 
 
One of the most noteworthy previous studies that we have been using is the work of Jaime 
Guajardo, Daniel Leigh and Andrea Prescatori (2011). The authors discuss and compare the 
differences of effects between CAPB and fiscal consolidation (also called action-based 
activity in the article). By identifying fiscal consolidation they are examining the analysis 
towards finding support for the expansionary austerity hypothesis (Guajardo et al., 2011).  
 
The standard method for measuring discretionary fiscal policy is called fiscal stance, a 
method that we are using as well (the change in our CAPB variable). However, the authors 
are critical of this measurement because they suspect that fiscal stance contains automated 
elements. They are therefore trying to construct their own measurements to find genuinely 
active measures from the document, a method that Romer and Romer first constructed. They 
“examine the behavior of economic activity following discretionary changes in fiscal policy 
that historical sources suggest are not correlated with the short-term domestic economic 
outlook” (Guajardo et al., 2011).  
Discretionary changes in fiscal policy are in other terms how a government's’ determination 
of the budget can increase the governmental finances by automatic. Guajardo et al. base their 
thesis on previous work from Alesina and Ardagna and are also examining the OECD-
countries over a much longer period than we do.  
They are using relevant equations (with fixed effects of countries and time) to indicate how 
big the effect of debt-to-GDP is. Additionally they estimate their assumptions through a 
baseline equation that reminds a lot like ours. But they develop their baseline equation further 
than we do, which excludes us from using any written articles from Romer and Romer. 
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3.4. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
 
The cyclical adjustment is based on the method proposed by Blanchard (1993). It is a simple 
method and rather transparent, which corrects various component of the government budget 
for year to year changes in the unemployment rate, which we mentioned above (see Alesina 
and Ardagna, 2010). 
The article that we have read characterizes the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks in government 
spending and taxes on economic activity in the United States in the post-war period. Turning 
to the effects of taxes and spending on the components of GDP, one of the results has a 
distinctly non-standard flavor: Both increases in taxes and increases in government spending 
have a strong negative effect on investment spending. 
Besides that their mainly subject is about America during post-war, the variables were rather 
interesting when Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti discussed the fiscal outcome of 
shocks in government spending. This is something we also have used in our thesis, because 
the austerity measurements are, among other reasons, to cut back in government spending and 
see what the outcome gives (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Another similarity is that the 
authors are focusing on the effects of the GDP in correlation to government spending as well 
as studying CAPB as a measure on austerity. 
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4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Data 
 
Our goal is to determine, with as much accuracy as possible, if austerity contributes to the 
Eurozone-countries’ recovery process from the Euro crisis. Austerity is in our case measured 
by examining the CAPB variable. The data we have collected is for all the countries in the 
Eurozone and the annual changes in our dependent variables, which were calculated in Excel.  
Our dependent variables are: the difference (∆) in real GDP (logarithm), the difference (∆) in 
unemployment rate, which is measured in percent of total workforce. Our third and last 
dependent variable is the difference (∆) in bank solvency. CAPB is our only explanatory 
variable in our regressions, and by using it as an independent variable we can examine how 
large of an impact it has on our dependent variables. To extend our analysis we also use two 
control variables, debt-to-GDP and relative unit labor cost (RULC).  
All our presented data has been collected from several international databases, such as the 
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), The European Central Bank Database (ECB), The 
Annual Macro-economic database (AMECO) and the World Databank. The data in each 
variable is coming from the same database, so that our data for our variables is as accurate as 
possible. For instance, ECB has gathered the overall solvency ratio from all financial 
institutions in each country and added them together into one value for each year. Almost all 
our data are based in percent so we translate our estimates into ratios, i.e. debt-to-GDP and 
unemployment rate.  
We accessed specific databases, when gathering our data, where we were able to choose 
countries, requested time series as well as the appropriate indicator. Then we translated our 
data into Excel to create our panel data. See our ‘data appendix’ for further information about 
our variables. 
 
The model can allow the parameters to change for both individuals (in our case the countries) 
as well as for time period. To prevent this, we add fixed effects. The fixed effect treats the 
observed quantities as they were non-random, regarding the explanatory- and controlling 
variables.  
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The fixed effect is an effect of non-random quantities. “Use fixed effects whenever you are 
only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time. Fixed effects explore 
the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity (country, person, 
company, etc.). Each entity has its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the predictor variables“(Torres-Reyna, 2007, Powerpoint). 
The main idea of the fixed effects model is that those time-invariant characteristics are unique 
to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual characteristics 
(Dougherty, 2011, p. 518-522). 
4.2 Methods/Theory 
 
Our thesis is inspired by “Expansionary Austerity: New International Evidence” written by 
Jaime Guajardo, Daniel Leigh and Andrea Pescatori. We have chosen to examine our data and 
regressions through a panel data. To be able to use our panel regression we need at least 30 
observations. However our panel data consists of 72 observations. The reason for the quite 
low amount of observation is because we lag our variables and use fixed effects. 
 
Since we have 19 countries to base our assumptions on within a period of five years (2009-
2013), panel data is the preferable way to calculate and analyze our data. It combines cross-
sectional dimensions and times series dimensions, which gives us the ability to observe the 
effect on specific actions or policies, i.e. CAPB give us a year-to-year perspective on the 
impact of the independent variable. 
The main reason that we do not base our regressions on quarterly data is that quarterly 
estimates of CAPB are not available for the Eurozone. We have gathered and analyzed three 
variables that reflects how austerity measures affects the country’s recovery process, namely, 
changes in GDP, unemployment rate and bank solvency. 
When taking our variables into consideration we wanted to examine if they all were stationary 
or not. There are several different methods to do this. “A time series process is said to be 
stationary if its ensemble distribution satisfies three conditions: (i) The mean of the 
distribution is independent of time. (ii) The variance of the distribution is independent of time. 
(iii) The covariance between its values at any two time points depends only on the distance 
between those points and not on time” (Dougherty, pp .465, 2011).  
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However, if none of the above terms are sufficient to decide whether our variables are 
stationary or non-stationary, there are certain methods to use. In fact, there are several tests to 
choose from, which can help us determine the correct answers. By doing so, we used a so-
called ‘test of stationary’, test type: Levin, Lin and Chu in Eviews. In addition, we included 
individual intercept and trend to the test equation. We selected the Schwartz Info criterion 
(automatic) to include all of our lagged variables. We examined all of our variables and 
performed this type of Panel unit-root test. If the probability was below five percent (<5%) 
we could draw the conclusion that the variable is stationary (Dougherty, pp.463-469, 2011). 
 
In mathematics and statistics, a stationary process is a stochastic process whose joint 
probability distribution does not change when shifted in time. Consequently, parameters such 
as the mean and variance do not change over time and do not follow any trends, if they are 
present. None of our considered variables are of spurious regressions-variety. In addition, 
stationary is used as a tool in time series analysis. The unit-root tests indicated that all 
variables in our estimated regressions were stationary. Our variables are stationary because all 
values within the various variables are circling around the zero-value. In other words, this is a 
positive effect that we want for all our variables. Also, in Eviews, you can confirm the test 
performed on the variables by studying the specific variable in “graph”, where an illustration 
can help to determine whether the variable is stationary or not. 
We will use tables and graphs to show our results and visualize information such as, ∆GDP 
and ∆GDP/∆CAPB, further on in our study, to give a greater understanding of the effects that 
is occurred by CAPB. Also, we will display our results in a table (Dougherty, p. 463-469, 
2011). 
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4.3 Specification of Equations 
 
As we mention in our first section we want to examine whether the austerity measure 
contributes to the Eurozone-countries’ recovery process from the Euro crisis or not, by 
studying CAPB. We start our specifications by testing how changes in the fiscal balance 
affect output growth, which gives us the following econometric specification, also known as 
our standard equation:  
 
 
 
Where ∆Y(t) is the logarithm of real GDP, ∆Ft is the chance in the fiscal stance in percent of 
GDP, and (t) is a vector of other developments that affect output. However, the equation 
above is ignoring country-specific effects as well as time-fixed effects, which gives us non-
lagged variables, and therefore an incorrect adjusted result.  
Because of the rather simplicity in the equation, there is problematic to give a detailed 
analysis. The first challenge would be to measure changes within the fiscal balance that reflect 
deliberate policy decisions executed by the government and not merely the automatic effect of 
the business cycle fluctuations. If there are no result changes in policy, an example of these 
types of business cycle fluctuations could be upswings in economic activity, which improve 
the budget balance automatically. In our standard equation, such mentioned developments 
affect both the regressor ∆Ft and the error term, t in the same direction. “Therefore, using the 
change in the overall fiscal balance to measure changes in fiscal stance would bias estimates 
toward finding expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity” (Guajardo 
et al., 2011).  
Cyclical adjustments offer an intuitive way of dealing with the fact that tax revenue and 
government spending move automatically with the business cycle.  The assumption is that, 
once they are cyclically adjusted, changes in fiscal variables reflect policymakers’ decisions 
to adjust taxes and government expenditures. An increase in the CAPB would therefore 
provide evidence of deliberate fiscal policy tightening. 
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4.3.1 Baseline equation 
 
But, it is important to put emphasize on the knowledge that the above equation explaining 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal data is far from perfect and is likely to bias the analysis toward 
finding evidence that supports the expansionary austerity hypothesis.  
In our second econometric specification we can examine the results for a longer period, by 
including lagged variables. The following equation is our baseline equation which was our 
base when we built our regressions: 
∆𝑌!,! =   𝜇! +   𝛿! +    𝛽!∆𝑌!,!!!!!!! +    𝛾∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵!,!!! +   𝑣!,!!!!!  
Where subscript i indexes countries, subscript t indexes years, and ∆Y is the logarithm of real 
GDP. Besides our focus on real GDP, we also consider the unemployment rate and the bank 
solvency as ∆Y. The latter variables do not need to be in logarithmic formula. To give a 
further explanation of the equation; the term µ denotes country-fixed effects, δ denotes year-
fixed effects, and 𝑣!,! is a mean-zero error term. The βs are the autoregressive coefficients 
focusing the normal dynamics of economic activity, while the γs are the direct effects 
(contemporaneous and lagged). The ∆CAPB - the austerity measure variable - is measured in 
percent of GDP, which in other words describes the change in fiscal stance, in year t 
motivated by a desire to reduce the budget deficit (Guajardo et al., 2011).  
 
Our econometric specifications, the baseline equation, consists both autoregressive lagged 
variables (AR), which is our dependent variable, Y, and distributed lagged variables (DL), 
which is our explaining variable(s), X. “A distributed-lag model is a dynamic model in which 
the effect of a regressor x on y occurs over time rather than all at once” (Baltagi, 2008, p. 129-
145). This means that our baseline model is an ARDL model, because it consists both of the 
above variables mentioned. The model is autoregressive since our dependent variable Y, is 
partly explained by lagged variables by itself. The model also has a distributed lag 
component, in the form of lags in our independent variable, CAPB. 
The specification is based on historical data, where we use two lagged-variables within the 
change of GDP (logarithm) and one-lagged variable in the CAPB-variable. The reason for this 
is that implementation of fiscal policies often has a delayed effect on macroeconomic 
variables.  
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Our regressions calculate how much 1 percent fiscal consolidation, in the form of CAPB, is 
affecting our dependent variables. These results are focusing to the short-term effects on 
GDP. 
 
4.3.2 Long-run Multiplier  
 
It is not enough to only focus on the short-term effects of GDP. From our regression we can 
implement the Beta coefficients and calculate the Long-run multiplier effects (LRM) with the 
following method: 
𝐿𝑅𝑀 =      𝛽! +   𝛽!!!(1 − 𝛼!!! + 𝛼!!! ) 
 
The LRM value is our result of how much our independent variable (CAPB) is actually 
affecting GDP in long-term period (Verbeek, 2012).  
The actual difference between short-run and long-run effects is that a short-term effect 
consists of the coefficient on the contemporary variable and therefore gives effect within the 
year. Long-term effects are infinite in time. However, in reality, most of the effects are 
already seen in a five-year period. 
4.3.3 Equation including control variable 
 
Our third and final econometric specification that we have been using to estimate our results 
is the following equation below:  
 ∆𝑌!,! =   𝜇! +   𝛿! +    𝛽!∆𝑌!,!!!!!!! +    𝛾∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵!,!!! +    𝛽!!!!!!!!! ∆𝐹!,!!! + 𝑣!,!   
Where subscript i indexes countries, subscript t indexes years, still identified as fixed effects. 
The ∆Y variable is still representing the same variables as in the previous equation. The main 
difference from the other equation is that we are including additional control variables, to get 
more accurate results. The latter part of the equation is describing the formula for the control 
variables. We have chosen government debt-to-GDP and relative unit labor cost (RULC) as 
controlling variables. Relative unit labor cost is a measure of unit labor cost, but the 
difference between the two terms is that the relative term is considered into a ratio, for 
example a ratio of country x and unit labor cost of country y (Felipe and Kumar, 2011).  
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“A rise in RULC indicates increased reward for labor's contribution to output. However if the 
rise in labor cost (wages) is greater than the rise in labor productivity, this may affect the 
economy’s cost competitiveness negatively” (Burda and Wyplosz, 2010, p. 292).  
 
These types of variables are independent and can “plausibly bias the analysis towards 
overstating the negative effects” (Guajardo et al., 2011). It is not necessary that the control 
variable(s) are being significant in the regression. We use them as a complement to see if our 
CAPB is affected by the other variables. For example government could increase their 
austerity measures more if other variables where not reducing the GDP as well. These 
variables may affect how much our explanatory variable (CAPB) is actually affecting GDP.  
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RESULT TABLE 
For	  Solvency:	  ∆CAPB	  =	  ∆CAPB(-­‐1)	  and	  ∆CAPB(-­‐1)	  =	  ∆CAPB(-­‐2 Significance levels (*): p<0,1;*, p<0,05**, p<0,01;***. (parenteses = Std error). All specifications contain full set country and time 
fixed effects. ∆Y(-1)  = ∆GDP(-1),  DEBT = debt-to-GDP ratio, RULC = Relative unit labor cost. ∆CAPB = fiscal stance. LRM = Long-run multiplier	  
X/Y	   GDP	   GDP	   GDP	   Unemployment	   Unemployment	   Unemployment	   Solvency	   Solvency	   Solvency	  
C	   0.0053***	   0.0079***	   0.0058***	   0.0004	   -­‐0.0034	   0.0008	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.0160***	   0.0278***	   0.0165***	  
	  	  	  	   (-­‐0.0008)	   (0.0013)	   (0.0006)	   (0.0017)	   (0.0026)	   (0.0017)	   (0.0021)	   (0.0047)	   (0.0021)	  
DY(-­‐1)	   0.2030***	   0.1803***	   0.1649***	   0.2954***	   0.2977***	   0.3246***	   -­‐0.5944***	   -­‐0.7186***	   -­‐0.6127***	  
	  	   (-­‐0.0595)	   (0.0596)	   (-­‐0.0476)	   (0.0729)	   (0.0721)	   (0.0946)	   (0.1052)	   (0.1078)	   (0.1020)	  
DY(-­‐2)	   -­‐0.2809***	   -­‐0.2474***	   -­‐0.2495***	   -­‐0.2040***	   -­‐0.1856***	   -­‐0.2223***	   -­‐0.9137***	   -­‐1.0919***	   -­‐0.9205***	  
	  	   (-­‐0.0502)	   (0.0500)	   (0.0392)	   (0.0686)	   (0.0678)	   (0.0762)	   (0.1324)	   (0.1399)	   (0.1276)	  
DCAPB	   -­‐0.2032***	   -­‐0.1769***	   -­‐0.1983***	   0.3425***	   0.2911**	   0.3121***	   0.2226***	   0.2698***	   0.3177***	  
	  	   (0.0594)	   (0.0578)	   (0.0485)	   (0.1116)	   (0.1122)	   (0.1143)	   (0.0825)	   (0.0793)	   (0.0890)	  
DCAPB(-­‐1)	   -­‐0.0821**	   -­‐0.0728**	   -­‐0.0783**	   0.1560**	   0.1296**	   0.1337**	   0.3616***	   0.3577***	   0.3578***	  
	  	   (0.0356)	   (0.0351)	   (0.0294)	   (0.0607)	   (0.0618)	   (0.0633)	   (0.0853)	   (0.0863)	   (0.0829)	  
DEBT	   	   -­‐0.0209*	   	   	   0.0233	   	   	   -­‐0.0586	   	  
	  	  	   	   (0.0119)	   	   	   (0.0221)	   	   	   (0.0397)	   	  
DEBT(-­‐1)	   	   -­‐0.0284**	   	   	   0.0463*	   	   	   -­‐0.1152***	   	  
	  	   	   (0.0130)	   	   	   (0.0238)	   	   	   (0.0408)	   	  
RULC	   	   	   0.2666***	   	   	   0.2443	   	   	   -­‐0.3052	  
	  	   	   	   (0,0673)	   	   	   (0.1588)	   	   	   (0.2517)	  
RULC(-­‐1)	   	   	   -­‐0.0965**	   	   	   -­‐0.0130	   	   	   -­‐0.2992**	  
	  	   	   	   (0.0371)	   	   	   (0.1121)	   	   	   (0.1296)	  
	  
LRM	   -­‐0.26	   -­‐0.23	   -­‐0.26	   0.55	   0.47	   0.50	   0.23	   0.22	   0.27	  
N	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	  
R2	   0.905	   0.917	   0.946	   0.836	   0.851	   0.846	   0.713	   0.758	   0.746	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4.4 Analysis of our estimations / results 
 
In this following section, we will present and discuss the results from our equations. These 
results will also be compared and analyzed with similar data from Guajardo et al.’s article. 
We will determine how much the austerity measures, identified as the CAPB variable, have 
affected the financial recovery of the countries within the Eurozone. Guajardo et al. are 
looking at GDP as a dependent variable, together with real private investment. We are as 
mentioned focusing on GBP, unemployment and bank solvency. Among their results they 
estimate a regression with the control variable debt-to-GDP ratio, which we are interested in 
as well. We will analyze each of our dependent variables one by one; where we will examine 
to what level CAPB has affected them. In opposite to Guajardo et al. article, we are not 
comparing the results of CAPB variable with another measure (action-based fiscal 
consolidation). Despite the many differences between our thesis and Guajardo et al.’s article, 
it is the closest to our study. 
4.4.1 Fiscal stance and GDP 
 
The first dependent variable that we are examining is the change in (log) Real GDP. When 
using our equations we conclude an estimated effect of a 1 percent GDP fiscal consolidation, 
that results in a general negative effect of -0.20 percent of GDP (t-stat = -3.42).  
By studying the result of our lagged variable of the change in GDP, we can conclude an 
additional effect in the fiscal consolidation the previous year. The estimate have a general 
negative effect on the current year GDP of -0.08 percent (t-stat = -2.31).  
The long-run multiplier is -0.26 percent. 
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Graph 1. Correlation between change in GDP and Fiscal Stance 
 
We can clearly see that a rise in CAPB has in general contractionary effect on GDP and 
therefore negative impact on economic recovery in the Eurozone. This is in line with the 
Keynesian theory that, contractionary fiscal policies will slow down the economic growth. 
With these results it is impossible for us to say whether implementation of contractionary 
fiscal policies might help a country to recover from a crisis or not. The long-run multiplier 
also gives us negative values, which strengthens the Keynesian theory about austerity 
measures. 
 
But, if we look more closely on specific countries we might see different trends in the 
correlation between the change in CAPB and GDP. By looking at the results in the Baltic 
States; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in Graph 2, we can see that they have many 
observations that show an increasing change, both in CAPB and GDP. Although they have 
positive CAPB values, which indicate contraction of fiscal stance, they have in many cases a 
positive GDP growth. This might be a non-Keynesian effect that we described earlier, where 
fiscal contraction improves the GDP.     
 
 
 
Country No
Austria 1
Belgium 2
Cyprus 3
Estonia 4
Finland 5
France 6
Germany 7
Greece 8
Ireland 9
Italy 10
Latvia 11
Lithuania 12
Luxembourg 13
Malta 14
Netherlands 15
Portugal 16
Slovak	  Republic 17
Slovenia 18
Spain 19
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Graph 2. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in GDP (Baltics) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We compare the Baltic countries with another group of countries, namely, the GIPSI 
countries. We can see that positive values in (∆CAPB), in general results in negative growth 
values for the GIPSI countries, by studying the Graph 3.   
 
Graph 3. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in GDP (GIPSI) 
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4.4.2 Fiscal stance and Unemployment  
	  
Unemployment in the Eurozone has increased substantially in many countries during our time 
period between 2009 and 2013, as Graph 4 shows us. One of the main reasons for this was 
that the financial crisis hit with decreased demand and GDP as consequences. The continuous 
increase, after the crisis, might be the  result of fiscal austerity.  
Graph 4. Unemployment ratio, the Eurozone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our results show that the estimated general effect on unemployment is an expansionary effect 
of 0.34 percent (t-stat = 3.07). Previous year has an effect of 0.16 percent (t-stat = 2.57). All 
these general effect is independent of which country or time-period and is the peak effect on 
GDP in the time-period. The long-run multiplier is 0.55 percent. The results show us that an 
increase in CAPB by 1 percent of GDP has a negative effect on unemployment. 
Unemployment increases in short-term and with the long run multiplier we can see that it 
grows even more. The distinction between our two areas is shown in the graphs below (Graph 
5 and 6). 
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Graph 5.  Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in Unemployment 
(Baltics) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in Unemployment 
(GIPSI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see in the two scattered graphs above, annual increases in the change of CAPB 
have negative effect on unemployment in the majority of the observations for the GIPSI 
countries. The observations in the Baltic area show that they have had times of increased 
unemployment in correlation with ∆CAPB as well. But as you can see in Graph 4 and 5, the 
unemployment in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has decreased since 2010, in comparison to 
the GIPSI countries where the unemployment has escalated.   
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Unemployment was above the average rate within the GIPSI countries before the financial 
crisis hit the Eurozone. During our observed time-period youth unemployment has totally 
exploded (World Economic Outlook, 2013). The anti-crisis policies in the EU, together with 
harsh austerity measures, especially in the Southern Europe, have driven up the 
unemployment, decreased real wages and cut social security systems. But according to many 
studies, the current economic crisis is thus “regarded as a crisis of competitiveness in which 
the main aim is to achieve comparative advantages through more flexibility on the labor 
market and lower labor costs” (Busch et. al, 2013). However, these cuts might have a positive 
effect on the economy in the long run. The Baltic countries’ unemployment also increased 
sharply at the time when the financial crisis hit Europe in 2008. The difference shown in our 
result is that the Baltic countries have managed to reduce their unemployment, maybe because 
of austerity measures, which also contradict the Keynesian theory.       
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4.4.3 Fiscal stance and Bank Solvency  
 
Graph 7. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in Bank solvency 
(Eurozone) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When we examined our third dependent variable, Bank solvency, we used the same equation 
as before, our baseline equation. However, when we lag the dependent variable only one time, 
we did not receive significant values. We therefore elaborated further with the variable and 
lagged it an additional time. By doing so, we received significant results. As you can see in 
our Result table, our estimated results indicates a general effect of a 1 percent GDP fiscal 
consolidation previous year (lag -1) has a positive/expansionary effect of 0.22 percent  
(t-stat = 2.70) and the year (lag -2) an expansionary effect of 0.36 percent (t-stat = 4.24).   
The result indicates that an increase in CAPB (with one percent of GDP) has a positive effect 
on bank solvency. An interesting observation in this result is that the two-year-lagged CAPB 
coefficient has a bigger impact on solvency comparing to the one-year-lagged variable. 
Solvency is a variable that apparently react slower to change in CAPB than our other 
dependent variables.  
Therefore, if we measure the solvency variable, we need to examine financial actions for a 
longer period to see what kind of effects CAPB has had on solvency. According to the long-
run multiplier we get an effect of 0.23 percent.  
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The long-run multiplier value is lower than the effect of the two-year-lagged. This indicates 
that the short term affects covers most of the change in solvency and that the effects after that 
are slowing down.  
A suggestion to a reason that an increase in CAPB might have a positive effect on bank 
solvency could be that banks in the Euro area reduced their lending to improve their solvency 
ratio to be able to successfully pass the bank stress test. These tests were prior to the crisis 
conducted by the banks themselves for internal valuation. Nowadays governmental regulators 
are conducting these tests, which put more pressure on the banks to show good results 
(Quagliariello, 2009, p. 1-2). This change in bank regulations restricts their ability to lend, 
and therefore increases banks solvency since they are not lending as much as they usually 
would do. This is a factor that could prolong the financial crisis (Wren-Lewis, 2014). 
The Basel II and future Basel III requirement of higher solvency ratio, with minimum 
solvency of 9 percent, instead of 7 percent for EU banks might have an impact on the increase 
in solvency, even though the majority of our observed countries’ bank sectors have a higher 
ratio than that. 
Graph 8. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in Bank solvency 
(Baltics) 
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Graph 9. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal Stance and change in Bank solvency 
(GIPSI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are in the following section comparing the bank solvency between the Baltic States  
(see Graph 8) and the GIPSI countries (see Graph 9). As we can see, both of these groups of 
countries have in general a positive correlation between CAPB and bank solvency. During the 
two first years of the financial crisis most of the major European banks have enhanced their 
solvency and strengthen their liquidity to much better levels than before the crisis. The reason 
for these actions is the persistent uncertainty about the economic and financial future for the 
Eurozone. By studying our graphs we can observe that the values within Graph 8, the Baltic 
States, are more scattered compared to Graph 9, the GIPSI countries.  It seems like the fiscal 
stance has affected the solvency in the financial sector of the GIPSI countries more effective 
and comprehensive. In the Baltic States it is difficult to see a trend of improved solvency, the 
observations is widely scattered. As we mentioned earlier an increasing solvency can be 
explained by the Basel requirements and stress tests.  Many banks in the GIPSI countries, and 
maybe especially banks in Greece and Ireland have received extensive rounds of 
recapitalization to improve their solvency.  
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4.4.4 Fiscal stance and Government deficit 
 
One of the main reasons for the implementation of austerity measures was to reduce the 
general government deficits, which in many countries were way to high. The contractionary 
fiscal stance that has been implemented has had significant effect on the deficits all around the 
Euro area. This is also the case for the Baltic States and the GIPSI countries. Both these 
regions have managed to reduce their deficits, which is probably a result of the contractionary 
fiscal stance that have been implemented, since the GDP growth in the GIPSI countries have 
been generally low or negative. You can see the positive trend in Graph 10 and 11.  
 
Graph 10 and 11. Suggestion of correlation between Fiscal stance and change in Gov. deficit 
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But the big difference between these two, is the debt-to-GDP ratio, where the GIPSI debt ratio 
have increased, while the Baltics have manage to keep their debt ratio low, as seen in Graph 
12. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all have debts well below the 60% ratio that the Maastricht 
Treaty has as a criterion for EU members.  
 
Graph 12. Debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.5 Control variables 
 
We also addresses that there is a possibility that our baseline model omits variables that have 
an effect on economic activity and could correlate with fiscal consolidation. The omitted 
variable bias may occur if the model is created and omits one or more causal factors. When 
the model is compensating for these missing factors by under- or overestimating the effect, 
“bias” is created.  It is important to at least control the equation with such factors, since they 
could influence our estimated effects. 
The motivation for these tests is to evaluate the accuracy of our deficit-driven fiscal 
consolidation. If we don’t take these variables into consideration, it could lead to that our 
model may under- or overestimates the effects of the change in fiscal stance. 
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Also, the reason for implementing the fiscal policy, and the size of this policy could be 
influenced by other factors. It is not easy to identify what kind of influence these variables 
may have on our current results.  
 
One variable that we consider important to use as a control variable, and could plausibly bias 
our results and analysis to overstate the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on our 
dependent variables, is the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the government debt is high, it could raise 
borrowing costs and therefore have a negative impact on fiscal growth. 
The second control variable we use is RULC. We choose this variable because it has been a 
heated topic in the debate regarding austerity and the recovery of the economy within the 
Euro area. Many countries in the Euro area are very dependent on exports and the RULC is an 
important factor when it comes to price competitiveness. Export affects GDP growth and that 
is why we thought this variable would be interesting to use.  
 
Our table shows that the difference between the results in our original baseline equation and 
our further equation with the included control variables debt-to-GDP ratio and RULC is quite 
similar. But as we can see in our result table some control variables are significant. This 
means that they affect our CAPB results and the change in GDP.  The difference is not much, 
but this means that by including these significant control variables, our results might become 
more accurate.  
We noticed one specific change in our results that stands out using the control variables. It is 
the difference in the effect that (DCAPB) has on Bank solvency. Using the baseline regression 
only, CAPB has the effect on solvency 0.2226***. When including the control variable 
RULC the effect is 0.3177***, this with only one of the lagged variable significant  
RULC(-1), with an effect of 0.1296**. This is an interesting change. According to us, this 
proves that the solvency regression is not very robust, since the control variable is correlated 
with CAPB variable.   
It is possible that both previous and current debt-to-GDP ratio is less interesting than future 
government debt. Therefore governments may undertake a fiscal consolidation as a reaction to 
the deficit if they are worried about the long-term outlook on debt-to-GDP. To inspect this 
you can focus on forward-looking indicators in variables such as, “perceived risk of future 
sovereign default” and “The long-term government bond yield” (Guajardo et al., 2011).  
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4.4.6 Vulnerabilities in thesis       
	  
It is important to mention that using the CAPB variable to estimate the macroeconomic 
effects of changes in fiscal stance might be rather problematic, as several studies point out. To 
begin with, cyclical adjustment approaches suffer from measurement errors that are likely to 
be correlated with economic developments.  
Especially, cyclical adjustment fails to eliminate the impact of heavy volatility within 
economic activity and asset prices from fiscal data. These effects are correlated with 
economic activity but are not necessarily related to fiscal policy actions. For example, a boom 
in the stock market improves the CAPB because it increases capital gains as well as 
cyclically-adjusted tax revenues. This effect is also likely to raise domestic demand. The next 
problem would be that even if the fiscal stance accurately reflects discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy, those reflections can be motivated by a desire to respond to cyclical fluctuations 
and not reductions in fiscal deficit. For instance, a government might want to cut government 
spending in an overheating economy, to imply that there is a positive correlation between 
fiscal policy tightening and fast economic growth. These shortcomings complicate potential 
examination to estimate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation, and are most 
likely to bias the analysis toward finding indication of expansionary effects (Devries et al., 
2011). 
We also want to highlight that our results on our dependent variable bank solvency is very 
much affected by changes in the government fiscal stance and with high significant values. 
This surprised us a bit even though we were hoping for significant effects. CAPB analyze 
changes in fiscal stance, where government revenues and expenditures are the two 
components. Is it really reasonable that CAPB have the amount of impact and significance on 
bank solvency that we have received in our results? We stand inquisitive in this matter and let 
this be a question to ask in further studies.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
In our thesis the main purpose was to examine if austerity measures have contributed to the 
Eurozone’s recovery process from the financial crisis, by focusing on fiscal stance. An 
increase in CAPB would mean that the country is heading towards a more contractionary 
fiscal policy. We are observing the effects of the variable over a five-year period to see how 
much of an impact the fiscal stance has had on our dependent variables. By observing our 
dependent variables, which are acting like catalysts, we will see how much austerity measures 
have aggravated the economic situation in the countries. 
The first conclusion that we can draw is that the Eurozone in general have suffered since the 
financial crisis hit in 2008. The contractionary fiscal policies with the aim to reduce deficits 
have had a negative impact on GDP growth and the economy in many Eurozone countries. 
This reaction is in line with Keynesian theory that is anticipating this effects by 
implementation of austerity. However, by analyzing different regions in the Eurozone, we can 
see that the recovery process, or lack of it, varies. Our comparison between the Baltic and the 
GIPSI countries is a good example of this. It is difficult to say why the Baltic States show a 
more positive ‘relation’ between CAPB and GDP (both increases) compared to the GIPSI 
countries. We believe that the Baltics have been through rough times before, where the 
population has been used to live during hard financially conditions, with increased 
unemployment following. Therefore, we consider the population within the Baltic States to be 
more ‘adjustable’ to fiscal reforms. In the GIPSI countries, on the contrary, they are not as 
used to these economic and financial conditions, which resulted in raging citizens when the 
GIPSI governments decided to cut salaries, jobs and state services. But we have seen Non-
Keynesian tendencies in especially the Baltic States. This might have to do with that people in 
these states become more confident about the future, since the government is actively trying 
to solve the economic problem they have put themselves in.  
This gives the public a positive view on the future and as a reaction, private consumption 
increases. If the rest of the world also starts to regain confidence in the country the foreign 
investments and capital would therefore start to increase and rise back to normal levels. The 
Baltic States have actually started to recover and they are on their way towards a normal 
economic situation.  
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Furthermore, it would be incorrect to state that austerity is overall negative for an economy. 
Fiscal measures in terms of austerity are regardless an important and effective way to improve 
a country's financial situation. High deficits and debt-to-GDP is harmful and austerity is a 
good tool for reducing these two. But it might be incorrect to implement harsh austerity 
measures as a way to recover from a financial crisis, when the demand and growth already is 
weak. 
We would say that it is rather a matter of timing when to implement austerity measures. As 
we mentioned earlier in our thesis: “The indebted periphery countries had great possibilities to 
reduce their public debt during the time of economic growth before 2007, instead when the 
crisis hit, they already had high public debt and deficits /.../ Economists have after the 
beginning of the financial crisis argued that it is not the crisis itself that have caused this 
downward spiraling effects on the economy, but the non-existing austerity measures and 
preparation during the time of economic growth” (Busch et. al, 2013).  
Therefore we can state that; during normal conditions austerity is an effective method for 
tightening the economy and reduce deficits and debt. But it might become ineffective and 
counterproductive when the normal economic conditions past and fiscal turmoil emerges. The 
general conclusion would be that contractionary fiscal stance is not contributing to a country’s 
recovery process, but with exceptions such as the Baltic States. Austerity is therefore not only 
cure for the Eurozone and we have to disagree with the German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble. 
5.2 Suggestions for further studies 
 
Our study analyzes whether the policy of austerity improved the recovery process within the 
Eurozone or not. By measuring that, we examined only the CAPB variable to see how much it 
affected other variables we thought would be relevant. We did not focus on what type of 
austerity measures that would be the most effective or least harmful for GDP growth. Our 
suggestions for further studies could be to study austerity measures on a deeper level, to see 
whether an increase in taxes or a cut in government expenditures is the most effective solution 
towards a more contractionary fiscal policy. Therefore, another suggestion for further studies 
would be to find an additional measure of austerity and then compare it with CAPB to see 
which one of the measures that is of most impact on the Eurozone recovery process. Another 
field of studies could be to analyze how the bank sector is affected by changes in fiscal stance, 
by analyzing solvency and other important key values.  
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7. Data Appendix  
                                                   
• Real GDP (logarithm values performed in Excel)  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
 
• Real GDP  
The difference in Real GDP, performed in Excel 
 
• Unemployment rate 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
 
• Unemployment rate 
The difference in Unemployment rate, performed in Excel 
 
• Bank solvency  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/euro/circulation/html/index.en.html#data 
 
• Bank solvency  
The difference in Bank solvency, performed in Excel 
 
• CAPB 
http://data.imf.org/?sk=7CB6619C-CF87-48DC-9443 2973E161ABEB&ss=1393468009141 
 
• CAPB (=fiscal stance)  
            The difference in CAPB, performed in Excel 
 
• Debt-to-GDP 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
 
• Relative ULC (RULC) 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/home?p_auth=ezQbFvs0&p_p_id=estatsearchportlet_WAR_estat
searchportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&_estatsearchportle
t_WAR_estatsearchportlet_action=search&text=rulc 
 
